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Abstract 
 
 Africa has been received an important amount of  foreign aid for several decades; however, it 
is among the poorest regions in the world. This study examines the relationship between 
foreign aid, economic growth and governance in the African region for the period of 1996-
2014. On fully applying both technique DOLS and FMOLS. In the first stage of this study, we 
examine the effet of foreign aid on economic growth. In the second stage, we assess the 
intermediary role of institutions in the relationship between Foreign aid and economic growth 
in African countries. It was found that  Foreign  aid has a negative effect on economic growth 
in African countries in both of FMOLS and DOLS models. However, empirical results 
indicate that foreign aid improves in terms of economic growth in the presence of good  
institution quality only in DOLS model. 
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1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of official aid is a subject that remains relevant today. Aid effectiveness is 
closely linked to government effectiveness. However, for development aid to be effective, the 
government must be effective. In order to be effective, the government must ensure property 
rights, defend citizens from violence, and also provide the infrastructure (Levi 2006, 5).  Also, 
the government must attain the more support, trust and legitimacy. Without trust and 
legitimacy, governments have difficulty preserving social order, implementing their policies 
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and obtaining external funds, especially official development aid.  In other words, only 
governments able to demonstrate its effectiveness to citizens and obtain their approval in the 
short term, as well as their confidence and legitimacy in the longer term, will have the 
necessary influence to guarantee the effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of economic growth. 
Generally, and particularly in African countries, citizens who consider public officials to be 
just, honest and competent are considerably more likely to approve of the incumbent 
government’s performance and are more likely to trust the government and trust the 
government than citizens who consider public officials as discriminatory, corrupt and 
ineffective. 
Improving the integrity and fairness of government and public servants will likely increase the 
willingness of citizens to pay taxes, which will strengthen the government’s ability to provide 
services and maintain a competent and honest bureaucracy over time. 
Foreign aid is seen as an important source of economic growth. Even though many studies 
have investigated the relationship between ODA (official development aid) and economic 
growth in developing countries, with most reporting mixed results. In fact, several recent 
studies, typified by the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000), show that foreign aid is more 
effective in countries having good institutions, this is the conditionality of effectiveness of 
foreign aid in terms of economic growth. Others argue that aid is more effective with 
diminishing returns (Hansen and Trap, 2000; Clemens et al., 2004; Ang, 2010). 
This study has gone ahead from the previous studies, by examining the long run relationship 
among foreign aid, governance and growth in African countries. But, the majority of previous 
researches have focused on the long run relationship in time series (Bassam (2008); Abd El 
Hamid Ali (2013)). For this reason, our primary goal is to investigate whether good 
governance, in African countries, has a long-run impact on improvement of effectiveness of 
foreign aid on economic growth. 
Also, other empirical results (such as those of Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Gomanee, 
Girma and Morrissey (2005), Bhattarai (2009), Kim (2011), Juselius, Moller and Tarp (2014)) 
supported the positive impact of foreign aid on economic growth while those of Papanek, 
(1973), Svensson (1999), Ovaska (2003), Mallik (2008), Alvi, Mukherjee and Shukralla 
(2008),  Herzer and Morrissey (2013) did not corroborate this point of view. As a result, it can 
be concluded that there is no common empirical evidence that confirms the impact of foreign 
aid on economic growth. 
This study builds on the previous discussion and contributes to the literature in a number of 
ways, including: (1) to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to have examined the link 
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between foreign aid, economic growth, and governance on a large sample of 48 countries in 
the African region. (2) This study not only verifies the effect of foreign aid on economic 
growth, but also explains whether the effectiveness of development aid in terms of economic 
growth improves in economies with institutional institutions. (3) There are few empirical 
studies that studied the effects of governance (as measured by the Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010) the six dimensions of governance of the World Bank, such as  control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, quality of regulation, rule of law and 
voice and accountability) in improving the effectiveness of foreign aid. In this case, this study 
uses an iterative approach by calculating a composite index of those six governance’s 
dimensions by the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Then, we use a disaggregated 
approach by applying each of the six indicators of good governance. This method is explained 
by the fact that it exists a correlation between these six indicators. 
(4) The majority of previous studies have investigated the long-term direct relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth for time series but neglected the role of 
institutional factors in improving the effectiveness of the long-term aid delivery on a large 
sample. In this framework, we use two new panel approaches (FMOLS, DOLS) to examine 
the long-term relationship between foreign aid, economic growth and institutional quality. In 
fact, the FMOLS estimator takes into account the nuisance parameters and possible 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity phenomena of the residues. It also corrects the 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In addition, to ensure the robust results, we adopt 
the DOLS approach to eliminate the correlation between regressions and the error term. (5) 
Previous studies have neglected short-term and long-term causality. For this reason, our work 
attempts to fill this gap by applying the Granger causality test which is based on the Panel 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. 
Then, the paper presents the methodology used and defines the data in section 3. Next, the 
empirical results and discussions are analyzed in section 4. The last section of the paper 
provides a conclusion and policy implications. 
2. Review of the literature 
It is necessary to note that financing the economy includes all the ways in which economic 
agents obtain the funds they need to carry out their activities. So, it is realized in two different 
ways: internal and/or external: the Internal financing is carried out by savings (Perkins et al, 
2008), but the external one is achieved through the use of the monetary and financial system, 
indebtedness, etc. Also, financing may be private (FDI, debt, donations…) or public 
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(development aid…).So, foreign aid represents the important source of financing for many 
countries, especially the poor ones. 
Over the last few decades, the domestic capital needed to ameliorate economic growth in 
developing countries, especially the African ones, is insufficient. In this case, those countries 
have received a massive amount of development aid in order to promote economic growth 
and mitigate poverty (World Bank, 2013). However, those objectives have not been achieved. 
So, we talk about the ineffectiveness of foreign aid. This ineffectiveness is explained, 
specially, by the bad management (Boone, 1996) and the bad quality of governance. Boone 
(1996) affirms that relationship between Foreign Aid and economic development is not 
significant for two reasons: firstly, capital shortage doesn’t cause poverty; secondly, if there is 
a large flow of aid, it is not optimal for politicians to adjust distortion policies. For 
relationship between international aid and corruption, some researches investigate that aid 
increases corruption (Asongu & Jellal (2013); Asongu (2014b)).  
Mosley (1980) and Taslim and Weliwita (2000) investigated that foreign aid had a negative 
effects on domestic savings. Similarly, Snyder (2000), Shields (2007) and Ouattara (2008) 
confirm the existence for a negative relationship between international aid and saving. 
Indeed, Mallik (2008) examined the effectiveness of foreign aid for economic growth in the 
six poorest and most aid-dependent African countries, such as Central African Republic, 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. Using the co-integration analysis, Mallik (2008) 
found that there is a long-term negative relationship between real GDP per capita and aid, as a 
percentage of GDP, investment, as a percentage of GDP and openness. Using simultaneous 
equations, Burke and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2006) reversed the thesis of aid effectiveness in 
terms of economic growth for the case of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, between 
1970 and 2000. Moreover, Khan and Ahmed (2007) conducted a study to answer the question 
of whether foreign aid is a blessing or a curse for Pakistan, using the ARDL approach. They 
found that foreign aid has a negative effect on economic growth. Other similar empirical 
studies such as those of Svensson 1999, Ovaska 2003, Mallik  2008  and Ang 2010, have 
strongly suggested that foreign aid has a negative effect on economic growth . 
However, we find studies in favor of the positive effects of aid on growth (Arndt et al., 2010; 
Juselius et al., 2014). In fact, Addison et al. (2005) showed that foreign Aid has a positive 
impact on growth and increases pro-poor public expenditure. According to these authors, 
foreign Aid broadly works largely to eliminate poverty, and, in the absence of aid, poverty 
would be higher. Also, Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2014) investigate that aid has promoted 
growth and decreased poverty and infant mortality. 
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In addition, others researches focused on the relationship between aid and corruption. In fact, 
Asongu&Jellal (2013) investigated that international Aid channeled through private 
investment and tax effort decreases corruption. Similarly, Okada & Samreth (2012) claim that 
corruption can be reduced by official development aid. 
Recently, Abd El Hamid Ali (2013) has studied the effectiveness of international aid for the 
case of Egypt during the period 1970-2010. More precisely, she has examined the long-term 
relationship between foreign aid and economic growth using the Johansen Cointegration Test 
and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). She found a negative and significant impact 
of foreign aid on short- and long-term economic growth. More recently, Arndt et al. (2015) 
have confirmed a positive impact of foreign aid on economic growth, including its effect on 
the immediate sources of growth (physical and human capital), on well-being indicators 
(poverty and child mortality) and measures of economic transformation (the share of 
agriculture and industry in the value added). Juselius, Moller and Tarp (2014) examined a 
long-term foreign aid relationship on key macroeconomic variables for a sample of 36 sub-
Saharan African countries covering the period 1960-2007 using the VAR model. They 
confirmed the thesis of the effectiveness of long-term aid on macroeconomic variables. 
Regarding Arndt et al. (2015), they showed that development aid helps stimulate economic 
growth, promote structural change, improve social indicators and reduce poverty. In addition, 
Moolio and Kong (2016) investigated the long-term relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth by applying co-integration tests for panel data on a sample of four countries 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar , Vietnam) of the ASEAN region for the period 1997-2014.  As 
for Moolio and Kong (2016), by applying both the FMOLS and DOLS models, they 
concluded that in the long term foreign aid has a favorable effect on economic growth. 
Similarly, Irandoust and Ericsson (2005) showed a positive and significant relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth for the African countries. They based their research 
on a sample of four African countries, those most benefiting from foreign aid in Africa, such 
as Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo, during the period between 1965 and 2000. 
However, some other studies have supported the idea that the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
terms of economic growth is conditional. These conditions include sound macroeconomic 
policies, democracy, institutional quality and governance, financial liberalization, and so on. 
According to a 1998 World Bank’s foreign aid study, this variable has a positive impact on 
economic growth in recipient countries with sound fiscal, monetary and trade policies. 
Similarly, some researchers argue that foreign aid can contribute to economic growth, but 
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only in countries with a good political environment (Burnside and Dollar 2000, Collier and 
Dollar 2002, Bhattarai 2009). Other researchers found that the foreign aid variable has a 
positive impact on economic growth, depending on the levels of democracy (Svensson 1999, 
Islam 2003) and financial liberalization (Ang 2010, Nkusu and Sayek 2004).  
In the same context, Ali and Isse (2005) studied the impact of foreign aid on economic 
growth. They found that foreign aid has a negative impact on economic growth. After 
studying the interaction between the foreign aid variable and the policy, they found that 
foreign aid promotes economic growth. Therefore, they suggested that the effectiveness of 
foreign aid in terms of growth is conditional on the existence of good policies. On the other 
hand, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) refuted the thesis of the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
the presence of a good political environment, showing that the effect of foreign aid on 
economic growth remains negative even by introducing the interaction variable between 
foreign help and the adopted policies. 
Other research studies have tried to examine the direct effect of foreign aid on corporate 
governance. For example, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) examined the relationship between 
foreign aid, institutions and corporate governance in 32 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
using the OLS methods and the double OLS. They found that foreign aid has worsened the 
quality of governance. In addition, they pointed out that large amounts of foreign aid can 
weaken the institutions and create incentives for aid agencies. This study was also supported 
by Sarwar, Hassan and Mahmood (2015) who showed that foreign aid is negatively and 
significantly correlated with corporate governance. In addition, foreign aid is associated with 
the deterioration of political and economic institutions. Other studies suggested that foreign 
aid increases the size of governments (Boone 1996, 2000). 
3. Sylized facts and scatter plots 
At the economic level, globalization is the main cause of strong inequalities between the 
North and South. It also strengthens the differences between countries of the South, which 
explains heterogeneity at the world level: African countries are marginalized while emerging 
countries experience rapid growth. Thus, official development aid would be seen as an 
instrument of international cooperation and aims to optimize the minimum welfare level of a 
marginalized population by financing projects that respect the natural and social environment. 
During the 2000s, governments gave major importance to the fight against poverty, aiming to 
achieve good governance and to protect the environment. With structural adjustment, several 
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efforts have increased, but the standard of living in some African countries is deteriorating. 
Similarly, the level of poverty in some countries is increasing. Structural adjustment was 
called into question because of poor privatization, chronic underinvestment in physical and 
human capital, and premature trade and financial liberalization. This adjustment gives priority 
to productive and social concerns, including the provision of basic services (health, education, 
etc.). This social change in aid is specifically supported by the adoption of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), hence a perfect analysis of the institutions and an emphasis on 
the quality of the legal environment. 
In recent years, Africa had achieved a turning point in its development and played a large role 
in the global economy. Regionally, growth differs from one region to another, reflecting 
different levels of development and natural endowment, the impact of climatic conditions and, 
in particular, the degree of political and social stability. Indeed, economic growth in low-
income Africa, as shown in Figure 1, has improved in the sense that GDP nearly doubled 
during the 1996-2013 period from 960,2 to 2278.7 (with a growth rate of 137, 31%). 
Figure 1: Evolution (on average) of foreign aid, governance and economic growth in 
African countries 
 
Source: The author. 
The impressive growth experienced in recent years in Africa is explained by several factors, 
the most important of which are better macroeconomic management, strong domestic demand 
and a relatively more stable political climate. Nevertheless, at the external level, this growth is 
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justified, in particular, by very high commodity prices, very strong economic cooperation 
with emerging countries, increased FDI flows, and a high level of ODA.  
As for aid flows received by African countries in recent years, Africa remains a major 
beneficiary of ODA. Indeed, the continent has recorded a sharp increase in terms of net flows 
of ODA. In fact, during this same period, Africa’s share of net ODA (on average) has risen 
sharply from 55.425 to 109,24, that is, with a growth rate of 97, 09%. In recent years, the 
selectivity of ODA is at the heart of the debate and is the subject of much criticism. Indeed, 
the main idea is to practice an optimal allocation of aid to fight against extreme poverty for 
example, according to certain criteria such as the level of needs and the degree of 
performance linked to the quality of governance of country in question. Thus, the quality of 
governance is a necessary condition for improving the effectiveness of aid in terms of 
economic growth, for this reason African countries are trying to improve their institutional 
qualities. 
According to the composite index of governance, the quality of governance is of poor quality 
in African economies. During the period 1996-2013, the values of the variable "governance" 
is below -0.31 (World Bank, 2013) in all countries regardless of income level, with the 
exception of certain countries, namely Mauritius. , Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and 
Cabo Verde, where governance is good (governance values are above 0). The quality of 
governance is poorer in African countries whose values (on average) vary between -0.63 and -
0.565 between 1996 and 2013.  
To make the relationship between variables considered in this study, we employed scatter 
plots with regression line. The regression line of figure 2 illustrates that the relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth is stable. Also, the regressions line of figures (from 
3 to 9) clearly shows that there is a positive relationship between GDP and all indicators of 
governance and their component index. That is, an increase in each indicator of good quality 
of institutions and their component index to increase the GDP per capita. 
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Figure 2. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Official development aid  
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Figure 3. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Governance  
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Source: The author. 
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Figure 4. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Control of Corruption 
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Source: The author. 
 
Figure 5. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Rules and Laws 
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Source: The author. 
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Figure 6. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Political Stability 
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Source: The author. 
 
Figure 7. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Voice and Accountability 
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Figure 8. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Governmental effectiveness 
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Source: The author. 
Figure 9. Scatter Plot of per Capita GDP and Reglementary Quality 
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4. Model, Data and methodology 
4.1. Model and Data 
In literature, there are three streams of thought: the first suggests that ODA promotes 
economic growth in the recipient countries. Nevertheless, the second current suggests that 
ODA has a negative impact on economic growth in the sense that foreign aid impedes 
investment and only increases consumer spending. On the other hand, the latest thinking 
shows that the effectiveness of foreign aid improves only in countries with sound institutional 
policies.  
Our econometric study aims to provide answers to the questions of the relationship between 
foreign aid and economic growth in forty eight African countries. So, in order to check for the 
mediation effect of governance institutions (see Baron and Kenny (1986)), we examine in first 
stage the impact of aid on economic growth. In second stage, we assess the impact of 
governance on economic growth in African economies. In third stage, we examine the aid 
effectiveness in presence of good governance. 
In this case, we will estimate the first model (equation 1) where economic growth (GDP per 
capita) is treated as a dependent variable, while development of foreign aid is the main 
independent variable alongside other variables (inflation, money supply, trade openness, 
population). Thus, the main question in this work is whether corporate governance has an 
important role in improving the effectiveness of the development of foreign aid in terms of 
economic growth. In order to answer this question, equation 2 will be estimated. 
Thus, to study the effectiveness of the development of foreign aid in the long term, in terms of 
economic growth, we consider a sample composed of 48 African countries over the period 
from 1996 to 2014. In a first place, we will estimate the following model:  
0 1 2it it it itY ODA X                 
Our dependent variable is ”Y” that is the log of GDP per capita in current US dollars, while 
the  
explanatory variables are: ODA is the log of the amount of the currently received US net aid 
per capita (McGillivray et al., 2006), “X” is the set of the explanatory variables, which 
includes the following variables: M2 is logarithm of monetary mass measured by money and 
quasi money as % of GDP) (Burnside and Dollar, 1997), Pop refers to population growth 
(annual%) (Ekanayake and Chatrna, 2010) which is a proxy for the labor force related to GDP 
(%) (McGillivray et al., 2006, Gries et al., 2009), Inf refers to inflation, which is 
(1) 
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approximated by the Consumer Price Index (McGillivray et al., 2006), open is the the trade 
opening that is measured by the sum of export and import relative to GDP(%) (McGillivray et 
al., 2006; Gries et al., 2009); oda2 is the square of aid (McGillivray et al., 2006). This variable 
was introduced to take into account the possibility of non-linearity of the link between aid and 
economic growth, theoretically based on the law of diminishing productivity of capital 
(Hansen and Tarp 2000, Clemens et al., 2004).,  β is a constant; ε designates the model error 
term; α represents the parameters to be estimated. 
In a second place, we will examine the effect of governance on economic growth. In this 
framework, we will firstly eliminate the variable “oda” in our model. Then we will introduce 
into our model the variable "Gov" measured by the component index of governance indicators 
of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) (Voice and Accountability (VA), Government 
Effectiveness ( GE), Political Stability (PS), Quality of Regulation (QR), Control of 
Corruption (CC), Rule of Law (RL)), by applying Principal Components Analysis (PCA). 
After, we will introduce each time one of the six dimensions in order to assess the effect of 
each indicator of governance on economic growth. The econometric model is specified as 
follows: 
= +      (2) 
The data on governance indicators are extracted from the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. The  WGI constructs aggregate indicators of six dimensions of 
governance: (1) Voice and accountability, which measure the participation ability of citizens 
to select their government, as well as freedom of expression, association and a free media; (2) 
Political stability and absence of violence, which capture the perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
means including politically motivated violence and terrorism; (3) Government effectiveness, 
which measures the degree of its autonomy from political pressures, the quality of the 
government to formulate policies and implement them; (4) Regulatory quality (REQ), which 
captures the perceptions of the government's ability to formulate sound economic policies and 
regulations for private sector development; (5) Rule of law, which captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence; (6) Control of corruption, which captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain including all forms of corruption, as 
well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. All the six indicators are scaled 
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from  2.5 to -2.5 point, with higher values corresponding to better governance and the lowest 
value corresponding to poor governance. 
In a lastly place, we will examine the effectiveness of the development of aid in the presence 
of governance. So, we will add in our model the variable "ODA * Gov" that represents the 
interaction between foreign aid and governance. The interaction of this variable gives us an 
idea of how much aid effectiveness in terms of economic growth improves in the presence of 
good institutional quality. The expected sign of this variable is positive in the sense that the 
effectiveness of international aid is improving in countries with sound economic policies. 
So, we re-estimate our model by applying the variable “gov” and the interaction between 
governance and aid “ODAGov”. The model to estimate at this stage is as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4*it it it it it itY ODA X ODA Gov Gov          
  
The dataset is a non-cylindrical panel includes 48 African countries for the period 1996-2014. 
The selection of countries and the study period were limited by the availability of data. All the 
variables were taken from the World Bank statistics with the exception of the governance 
variable, which was derived from World Governance Indicators (WGI) while the inflation 
variable was obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Table 1 summarizes the 
sources of our data. 
Table1. Data and source 
4.2. Methodology 
As the initial attempt in exploring the aid effectiveness in African countries in the long run, 
the paper examines this relationship using DOLS and FMOLS approaches. Firstly, unit root 
tests are used in order to identify the presence of long-run characteristics in each variable. 
Panel unit root tests (first and second generation unit root tests) are conducted to test whether 
there is a presence of stationarity in the data series of African countries. In the paper, we 
employ four types of unit root test. For the first generation unit root tests, we use Levin, Lin, 
and Chu (LLC) test and Im, Peseran and Shin (IPS) test. However for the second generation 
unit root tests, we use the Bai and Ng (2004) test and Pesaran (2003) test. For each variable, 
the tests are employed in order to determine the order of integration or the number of 
differencing operations to render the series stationary.  
Secondly, cointegration tests are employed in order to identify the presence of a long-run 
relationship among the variables with long-run characteristics. The cointegration tests include 
the Kao test and the Pedroni tests proposed in Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004) 
(3) 
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respectively. This technique checks whether between all variables, there is a long run 
relationship.   
Lastly, the cointegrating equation estimations include the application of the DOLS and 
FMOLS approaches proposed in Kao and Chiang (2000) and Phillips and Moon (1999) 
respectively. These techniques seek to estimate or quantify the long-run relationship among 
the variables. DOLS technique solves the endogeneity problem and eliminates serial 
correlation present in standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In fact, OLS estimation is 
inconsistent in the cointegration panel series data (Dreger and Reimer, 2005). While DOLS 
and FMOLS solve the problem of endogeneity and eliminate small sample bias, the 
application of the FMOLS approach essentially requires that all variables must have the same 
order of integration and that the regressors must not appear as co-integrated. In line with Kao 
and Chiang (2000), DOLS outperfoms FMOLS estimators in terms of mean biases.  
5. Results and discussion 
Before proceeding to the long-run relationship between aid and growth, examining the unit-
root properties of all the series in the study is the first step. The variables in this study should 
be integrated at the same order, in order to produce the FMOLS and DOLS tests. To study the 
stationarity properties of the variables, the Levin and al. (2002) and Im and al. (2003) tests are 
conducted. The study of Levin et al. (2002), Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC)) is structured around the 
panel Dickey-Fuller augmented panel (ADF) tests, which assume that there is a homogeneity 
in the dynamics of the autoregressive coefficients with inter-individual independence between 
the residues. The next step involves testing the presence of a long-term relationship between 
the series. In this paper the panel cointegration tests (Pedroni’s test (2004) and Kao’s test 
employed the residual of Phillips and Perron (1988) and Dickey and Fuller (1979)) are 
employed. 
5.1. Aid and Economic growth 
The unit-root properties are investigated by applying the Levin, Lin & Chu t (2002) and Im, 
Pesaran and Shin W-stat (2003) tests. The finding of unit-root tests are reported in table 2.  
The empirical evidence supports all the variables to be stationary in first difference. So, we 
can suggest all the variables to be integrated at order one, I(1). 
Table 2. Panel unit root tests results 
Due to the same integrating order of all the series, it is appropriate to implement Pedroni’s 
(2004) tests in order to examine the existence of the long-run relationship among the 
variables. Regarding the analysis of co-integration (table (3)), Pedroni’s (2004) tests enabled 
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us to analyze it in the context of this study. The set of alternative co-integration test 
hypotheses is accepted. As a result, these tests confirm the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
no co-integration since the results of these tests confirm the existence of a co-integration 
relationship between the variables. 
Table 3.Cointegration tests results 
According to the usual tests of the unit root on the time series, all the series used in our study 
are integrated of the same order. On the other hand, the co-integration test revealed the 
existence of a long-term relationship in our model, which enables us to estimate our FMOLS 
and DOLS models. 
Table 4.  Panel FMOLS and DOLS results 
The results of the estimation of the FMOLS and DOLS models are presented in table 4. 
Moreover, the coefficients estimated from these two models can be used as long-term 
elasticities. It is obvious to note that the coefficients estimated from the two models FMOLS 
and DOLS models are very close and have the same signs. Indeed, from the results presented 
in table 4, we found that the coefficients obtained from the regression are statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance except for the case of trade openness and the ODA2. 
Regarding development of foreign aid, its coefficient is negative and significant at 10% and 
5% level in the FMOLS and DOLS models, respectively. So, we can point out that in the long 
term, foreign aid has a negative effect on economic growth in the region. In fact, foreign aid 
decreases the investment of the recipient countries, discourages the financing of several 
projects in all the fields and increases the consumption expenditures. These results oppose 
those of Juselius, Moller and Tarp (2014) and Moolio and Kong (2016). 
Besides, our empirical research shows that inflation has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Indeed, the coefficient of inflation shows that an increase of 1% will raise economic growth 
between 0.468436% and 0.422373% in long run via FMOLS and DOLS respectively. The 
positive relationship between inflation and economic growth can be explained by the fact that 
inflation, the locomotive of investment, can lead to output growth and employment. Then 
economic growth improves. 
On the other hand, when the money supply increases by 1%, economic growth increases by 
0.304743% and 0.234678%, respectively, for the two models FMOLS and DOLS. Similarly, 
the labor force measured by the rate of population growth positively affects economic growth. 
The variable labor force measured by the annual population growth (pop) is significant only 
in the FMOLS model. For the others explanatory variables “oda2” and “ouv”, they are not 
significant in the DOLS and FMOLS models. So; we conclude the absence of correlation 
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between these variable and the economic growth, the results infirm these of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000). 
5.2. Governance and economic growth 
The empirical analysis starts with analyzing the relationship between governance and 
economic growth. So, we will estimate equation (2). We adopted an approach based on 
FMOLS and DOLS models. Our results presented in table 7 show that the overall governance 
has a positive and significant impact on economic growth. In this case, we estimate 7 
regressions in our model. In the first one, the variable “GOV” presents the component index 
of the six dimensions of governance. Then, we estimate our model (eq (2)) when “GOV” 
presents each time one of these six dimensions of institutional quality.  So, our findings 
presented in table 7 confirm that the overall governance has a significant positive relationship 
with economic growth both in FMOLS and DOLS models. However, the disaggreged analysis 
of governance indicators show mixed results. In fact, the dimensions of governance namely 
Political Stability, Voice and Accountability, Rule of law, Regulatory Quality and 
Government effectiveness promote economic growth. The positive impact of governance on 
economic growth can be explained by the fact that good governance implies political stability, 
rigid rule of law, et al., which could encourage the “helping hand” of power or inhibit the 
“grabbing hand” of power, leading to good economic growth performance. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient Control of Corruption is negatively correlated with economic 
growth. This implies that corruption reduces economic growth. The negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth can be explained, especially, by the fact that 
corruption increases the transaction cost and the production cost. Also, the corruption 
decreases the consumer confidence and investor confidence. So, it degenerates the trust of the 
society. 
Table 7.  Governance and economic growth: long-run relationship 
5.3. Effectiveness of foreign aid in the presence of governance 
To test the existence of a long-term relationship between the development of foreign aid and 
economic growth in the presence of governance, we will estimate, at this stage, equation 3. 
Thus, we apply, in the first place, the KAO test to check the existence of a co-integration 
relationship between the studied variables. The results of this test show that the probability 
associated with T-statistics (0.0044) is less than 5%, which makes it possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration. This implies the existence of a long-run relationship between 
foreign aid and economic growth in the presence of governance in the African economies. 
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As explained previously, the expected sign of “α1” is ambiguous. If “α1”>0, the conventional 
view that international assistance for development drives growth holds. Alternatively,  “α1”<0 
implies support for unconventional vision, in which case increase in international aid for 
development is associated, in the long-run, with complacency and indifference behavior  
leading to a decline in economic growth. The expected sign of “α4”, which represents the 
direct effect of the governance quality on economic activity, in the long term, is also 
theoretically ambiguous. The expected sign of the coefficient of the interaction term “α3” is 
also uncertain for reasons previously discussed, and is ultimately an empirical question. If  
“α3” has the same sign as  “α1”, then the direct effect of aid, in the long term, will be 
reinforced at higher levels of governance quality. On the other hand, if  “α3” and  α1are of 
opposite signs, more improvement of governance quality will weaken the direct effect of 
international aid, in the long-run. 
The results of the FMOLS and DOLS regression are presented in table (8) that indicates that 
equation (3) is tested using the composite index of six governance indicators. Aid is effective 
in terms of economic growth, in the long-run, in the presence of governance, if and only if the 
coefficient of the variable of the interaction between aid and governance (that is, the 
coefficient of the variable ("ODA*GOV") is statistically positive and significant. Indeed, the 
results of the regressions presented in the tables (8) show that the evidence in favor of aid 
raising growth, in long term, only in good policy environments remains inconclusive. The 
results presents in table (8) show that the effectiveness of foreign aid increases, in the long-
run, in presence of governance. In fact, the interaction term coefficient is only significant in 
the DOLS model. Indeed, the coefficient of aid-governance interaction in Model 2 (0.1447 for 
DOLS) is higher than the coefficient of aid in Model 1 (-0,1988).  
For the other explanatory variables: the coefficients of inflation (INF) and money supply (M2) 
are significantly and positively correlated in the long run to economic growth and they retain 
the same signs as in Model 1 except for the case of inflation in the FMOLS model, the 
coefficient is not significant. The coefficient of trade openness is significant only for the 
DOLS model, but when trade openness increases in the long run by 1%, economic growth 
increases by 0.633%. This means that an enhancement of liberalization process leads to a 
positive influence on economic performance. Therefore, liberalization will facilitate the 
transfer of technologies witch improve the productivity; it therefore has a positive impact on 
economic growth. These findings are in line with those of Tiba et al (2015). 
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Nevertheless, it is evident that the majority of elasticity of these variables relative to economic 
growth has decreased compared to those found in Model 1 in both the FMOLS and DOLS 
models. 
Table 6. KAO test results 
Table 8.  Aid, growth and governance: long-run relationship 
5.4. Effectiveness of foreign aid in presence of six indicators of governance 
In order to test the conjecture that aid is more effective when specific macroeconomic policies 
are in place, we use the variable “governance”, measured by the composite component of the 
six dimensions of governance of World Bank. In this part, we will try to identify what the 
more pertinent indicator that can ameliorate, in the long term, the effectiveness of foreign aid 
in terms of economic growth. So, we will estimate the long-term effect of aid on growth in 
presence of each dimensions of governance. In this case, the variable “gov” in our model (eq 
3) denotes each of the six indicators of good governance. So, we have six specifications (M1, 
M2, M3, M4, M5 and M6) where we include these indicators (political Stability, quality of 
regulation, Voice and Accountability, Control of Corruption, rule of law, government 
effectiveness), respectively, in the FMOLS model. We have, also, six specifications (M7, M8, 
M9, M10, M11 and M12) where we include these same indicators, in the DOLS model. 
We note that the 6 variables of interaction between foreign aid and each indicators of 
governance in the FMOLS model are not significant for the whole panel. At this stage, we 
can’t conclude that institutions play a significant role in the amelioration of effectiveness of 
foreign aid, in the long-run of our entire panel. However, all these variables are significant at 
one percent level, in the DOLS model.  So, we can say that the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
terms of economic growth is ameliorated in the presence of governance, measured by the six 
dimensions of World Bank Governance. This implies that donors should not only give aid, but 
increase its allocation to countries where there is improved level of governance. These 
findings, which are in line  with the study of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Adedokun 
(2017). 
Nevertheless, the results of table (10) show that the most pertinent indicators that ameliorate 
the aid’s effectiveness are “Control of Corruption”, “Voice and Accountability” and “Quality 
of Regulation” whose coefficients are 0,620; 0,510 and 0,537, respectively. 
Table 9: FMOLS test results 
Table 10: DOLS test results 
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6. Conclusion and political implications 
The work of descriptive and econometric analysis above is a contribution to the debate on 
effectiveness of foreign aid, in the long-run, in presence of governance in African countries. 
The results of our studies based on a sample of fourty eight African countries, permit us to 
conclude as Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Abd El Hamid Ali (2013) on high significance in 
the relationship between "good governance" and effectiveness of international aid in terms of 
economic growth: We found that, in the DOLS model -as opposed to the FMOLS model-, the 
conjecture that aid is more effective when specific macroeconomic policies are in place is 
confirmed. 
Despite a substantial aid effectiveness literature, we still know little about the long-run 
relationship between aid, growth and governance. Our analysis points to the need for further 
research aimed at identifying the effectiveness of aid in presence of governance over relevant 
time periods on a panel data 
 
Panel regressions confirm the cross-sectional results: an increase in average foreign aid of 1 
percentage point of GDP is associated with average per capita GDP growth 19 years later that 
is higher by 0.2 percentage points. 
In recent decades, economic theory has largely emphasized the effectiveness of foreign aid, 
with the majority of cases indicating that this effectiveness improves with the presence of a 
sound institutional framework. 
In fact, the major objective of the developing countries, especially the African ones, is to 
reach the developed countries, improve economic growth and reduce poverty. Thus, our 
document brings this dilemma to highlight the improvement of the effectiveness of foreign 
aid development, especially in the long term, in the presence of good governance. In an effort 
to address this problem, the purpose of this paper is to examine the link between foreign aid 
and economic growth in the presence of governance on a panel model of 48 African countries 
from 1996 to 2014 using the FMOLS and DOLS models. The results show that foreign aid 
development improves economic growth in the presence of long-term institutional quality. On 
the other hand, we test the causality between the effectiveness of foreign aid development and 
economic growth. In fact, we found that there is a long causality between the studied 
phenomena. 
Thus, the policy implications of our study suggest that the institutional factor plays a key role 
over time in helping the African countries to improve the effectiveness of development 
assistance in terms of economic growth. In other words, long-term development assistance 
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promotes economic growth, but this efficiency improves with the presence of a healthy 
institutional environment. 
Therefore, given the importance of the quality of governance in improving the effectiveness 
of the ODA, it is essential to focus on the application of the principles of governance. Indeed, 
international aid is well used in a country characterized by transparent, accountable and 
enforced institutions of laws and regulations by ensuring the participation of both the 
stakeholders and the civil society. 
In fact, no one can deny that a good governance in Africa at all levels in the political, social 
and economic spheres is crucial for the promotion of growth and the development and 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. On the other hand, the contagion of a 
culture of good governance is crucial for a rational economic management, an effective 
service delivery and an empowerment of the people.  
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TABLES 
Table1. Data and source  
Variable Definition  Source 
GDP The GDP per capita in current US dollars World bank 
ODA the amount of US current received net aid per capita World bank 
ODA2 the square of aid World bank 
Open The trade opening that is measured by the sum of export and 
import relative to GDP(%) 
World bank 
M2 The monetary mass measured by money and quasi money as % 
of GDP 
World bank  
Pop The population growth (annual %) World bank 
Inf The rate of inflation calculated on the basis of the consumer 
price index 
International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS) 
Gov It is a synthetic measure of the quality of governance of countries 
by weighting and aggregation of different scores presented by 
Kaufman et al. (2010) using Principal Component Analysis. This 
measure integrates six indicators into a composite index that 
takes into account: 1) political stability; 2) Voice and 
accountability; 3) the effectiveness of public authorities; 4) the 
quality of regulation; 5) the rule of law and 6) the control of 
corruption. 
Author’s 
calculation 
PS political stability World bank 
VA Voice and accountability World bank 
EG the effectiveness of public authorities World bank 
QR the quality of regulation World bank 
RL the rule of law World bank 
CC the control of corruption. World bank 
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Table 2. Panel unit root tests results 
 
First generation of unit root test 
Level first difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu t Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  Levin, Lin & Chu t Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  
GDP 
-0.23462  2.21012 -14.3889*** -13.0184*** 
(0.4073)  (0.9865)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
ODA 
-4.83987*** -2.08570** -20.4395*** -17.5427*** 
(0.0000)  (0.0185) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Open 
-2.43345*** -1.05580 -18.8392*** -16.7181*** 
(0.0075)  (0.1455)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
M2 
-3.86707*** -0.05203 -16.5003*** -12.5029*** 
(0.0001)  (0.4793)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Inf 
 1.07026 -9.03214*** -14.8067*** -15.5248*** 
 (0.8577)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Pop 
-1.87220** -4.67160*** -11.2724*** -14.3048*** 
 (0.0306)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Gov 
 
-10.8107*** -1.89320** -19.8363*** -7.65558*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0292)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 Second generation of unit root test 
 Level First difference 
 Bai and Ng  Pesaran  Bai and Ng Pesaran 
GDP 
 1.78268 -0.13861 -2.59911 -32.3566 
( 0.9627) ( 0.4449)  (0.0047)***  (0.0000)*** 
ODA 
 2.86868  0.96440 -10.7904*** -32.3566*** 
 (0.9979)  (0.8326)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Open 
 6.08033  1.38295 -16.6724*** -2.82813*** 
( 1.0000)  (0.9167)  (0.0000)  (0.0023) 
M2 
 1.65936  0.76121 -1.95843** -1.60862* 
 (0.9515)  (0.7767)  (0.0251) (0.0538) 
Inf 
-0.29905 -0.92431 -1.95843** -1.60862* 
( 0.3825)  (0.1777)  (0.0251)  (0.0538) 
Pop 
-0.45968  7.48472 -15.5940*** -16.0640*** 
 (0.3229)  (1.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Gov 
 
 9.20374  12.2057 -7.84318*** -8.78719*** 
 (1.0000)  (1.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
Values in parentheses are p-values. 
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Table 3.Cointegration tests results 
within-dimension 
 
  
Statistic Prob. Weighted Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.314305  0.6234 -3.717569 
 
0.9999 
Panel rho-Statistic  8.662106  1.0000  8.419623 
 
1.0000 
Panel PP-Statistic -1.658877  0.0486 -6.959101 
 
0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -2.596041  0.0047 -5.333413 
 
0.0000 
between-dimension 
  
Statistic Prob. 
  Group rho-Statistic  10.45125  1.0000 
  Group PP-Statistic -18.84457  0.0000 
  Group ADF-Statistic -7.528286  0.0000 
  ***, **, and * indicates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
Table 4 .  Panel FMOLS and DOLS results 
  
INF M2 ODA ODA2 POP Open 
FMOLS 
0.468436*** 0.304743*** -0.294640*** 0.007163 -0.092122* -0.207713 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0023) (0.6153) (0.0178) (0.1021) 
DOLS 
0.422373*** 0.234678*** -0.198847** 0.002064 -0.055004 -0.212850 
(0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0403) (0.8858) (0.1629) (0.1030) 
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Values in parentheses are p-values. 
Tableau 5. KAO test results 
 t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF -2.617358  0.0044*** 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
Tableau 6. KAO test results (Governance-economic growth) 
 t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF 
3.622925 0.0001 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
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Tableau 7. Governance-Economic growth: long-run relationship  
FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS 
GOV 0.175373*** 0.111902***                         
  
0.0000 0.0068                         
CC     
-
0.429135*** 
-
0.369324***                     
  
    0.0067 0.0044                     
GE         0.055601* 0.354395***                 
  
        0.0875 0.0016                 
PS             0.058424*** 0.040528**             
              0.0000 0.0108             
RQ                 0.046576* 0.048847*         
                  0.0741 0.0608         
RL                     0.115401** 0.040479**     
                      0.0228 0.0496     
VA                         0.062865*** 0.068195* 
                          0.0035 0.0532 
INF 0.115764*** 0.167989*** 0.028458*** -0.000107 0.105135*** 0.360334*** 0.092404*** 0.142466*** 0.085429 0.151276*** 
-
0.002534*** 0.000109 0.147205*** 0.129366***
  
0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.7420 0.0012 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.1410 0.0000 0.0028 0.1275 0.0003 0.0000 
M2 0.096828* 0.052115* 1.622621*** 1.604785*** 0.098717** 0.847765*** 0.082100*** 0.034137 0.086169*** 0.082129*** 0.190765*** 0.163025*** 0.029312 0.045794 
  
0.0636 0.0782 0.0000 0.0000 0.0584 0.0000 0.0017 0.2812 0.0012 0.0044 0.0000 0.0000 0.2680 0.1055 
Open 0.083637*** -0.023756 1.203863*** 1.262284*** 0.085698** -0.077024 0.111066*** 0.022805 0.115413* 0.053257 
-
0.170420*** 0.028318 0.078002 0.025296 
  
0.0066 0.5587 0.0000 0.0000 0.0267 0.6987 0.0052 0.5933 0.0818 0.2890 0.0089 0.4223 0.1159 0.5430 
POP 
-
0.214335*** -0.026252 0.050805 0.181277*** 
-
0.140627*** 0.672757*** 
-
0.142485*** 0.003216 -0.092524 0.036483 0.062826** 0.028407*** 
-
0.163976*** 0.006707 
  0.0000 0.4194 0.5543 0.0099 0.0046 0.0000 0.0025 0.9269 0.1509 0.2510 0.0270 0.0008 0.0032 0.8379 
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively; (Values in parentheses are p-values). 
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Table 8.  Aid, growth and governance: long-run relationship  
  
INF M2 ODA ODA2 POP Open ODAGOV GOV 
FMOLS 
0.970542*** 0.095311 0.081611 -0.004319 0.015806 -0.375514*** 0.006339 0.181623 
(0.0000) (0.1448) (0.4750) (0.7563) (0.7546) (0.0004) (0.8734) (0.3284) 
DOLS 
0.444676*** 0.235213*** 0.375514*** -0.017975 -0.030500 -0.151123 0.144745*** -0.633201*** 
(0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.2587) (0.4637) (0.2364) (0.0028) (0.0024) 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent levels respectively. 
Values in parentheses are p-values. 
Table 9: FMOLS test results 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
ODA 0.989451 0.327035 1.168997 0.745941 0.843735 0.786036 
 
(0.3944) (0.7856) (0.2996) (0.4775) (0.4415) (0.4633) 
ODA2 -0.166245 0.030102 -0.147907 -0.031684 -0.161237 -0.131263 
 
(0.3020) (0.8849) (0.3181) (0.8401) (0.3796) (0.4697) 
odaPS 0.041213      
 (0.9246)      
PS 0.010691      
 
(0.9950)      
odaQR  0.838567     
 
 (0.2842)     
QR  -3.138483     
 
 (0.3168)     
odaVA   0.423495    
   (0.4370)    
VA   -1.478863    
   (0.4964)    
odaCC    0.977804   
 
   (0.1598)   
CC    -3.641420   
    (0.1777)   
odaRL     -0.112154  
 
    (0.8712)  
RL     0.604649  
     (0.8222)  
odaEG      0.003902 
 
     (0.9947) 
EG      0.108311 
32 
 
      (0.9623) 
Open 0.162580 0.121884 0.019865 -0.192950 0.125388 0.135682 
 
(0.7818) (0.8354) (0.9751) (0.7306) (0.8255) (0.8197) 
POP -0.222270 -0.225974 -0.229120 -0.227572 -0.242009 -0.216516 
 
(0.4090) (0.4182) (0.3919) (0.3587) (0.3721) (0.4335) 
INF 1.118550* 0.951665* 0.859370 0.834741 1.171059** 1.079382* 
 
(0.0558) (0.0736) (0.1550) (0.1285) (0.0412) (0.0597) 
M2 0.123898 0.222488 0.205884 0.249622 0.244739 0.260760 
 
(0.7544) (0.5033) (0.5483) (0.4622) (0.4913) (0.4344) 
**, and * indicates statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Values in parentheses are p-values. 
 
Table 10: DOLS test results 
 
M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
ODA 0.411335** 0.490756*** 0.485109*** 0.515632*** 0.470974*** 0.459166** 
 
(0.0339) (0.0062) (0.0094) (0.0040) (0.0092) (0.0102) 
ODA2 -0.067610** -0.068084*** -0.064947** -0.070268*** -0.061861** -0.063596** 
 
(0.0146) (0.0064) (0.0146) (0.0055) (0.0150) (0.0114) 
odaPS 0.251551***      
 (0.0001)      
PS -0.648572***      
 
(0.0009)      
odaQR  0.537408***     
 
 (0.0000)     
QR  -1.472638***     
 
 (0.0000)     
odaVA   0.510311***    
   (0.0000)    
VA   -1.455910***    
   (0.0000)    
odaCC    0.620023***   
 
   (0.0000)   
CC    -1.628338***   
    (0.0000)   
odaRL     0.491870***  
 
    (0.0000)  
RL     -1.425865***  
     (0.0000)  
odaEG      0.478926*** 
 
     (0.0000) 
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EG      -1.264374*** 
      (0.0000) 
Open 1.014162*** 0.823726*** 0.781128*** 0.764706*** 0.782762*** 0.813837*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
POP -0.128996* -0.120755 -0.146351 -0.110293 -0.156912 -0.103397 
 
(0.0591) (0.0650) (0.0241) (0.0989) (0.0186) (0.1174) 
INF 0.709791*** 0.703929*** 0.675924*** 0.735252*** 0.693579*** 0.724492*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
M2 0.824667*** 0.801426*** 0.829942*** 0.767246*** 0.830415*** 0.797394*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Values in parentheses are p-values. 
